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Multiple realisation prompts the question: how is it that multiple
systems all exhibit the same phenomena despite their different under-
lying properties? In this paper I develop a framework for addressing
that question and argue that multiple realisation can be reductively
explained. I illustrate this position by applying the framework to
a simple example – the multiple realisation of electrical conductiv-
ity. I defend my account by addressing potential objections: contra
(e.g.) (Polger and Shapiro, 2016), (Batterman, 2018), and (Sober, 1999),
I claim that multiple realisation is commonplace, that it can be reduc-
tively explained, but that it requires a sui generis reductive explanatory
strategy.
1 Introduction
An ever-increasing range of phenomena may be offered reductive expla-
nations in terms of their lower-level constituents. As such, evidence for
reductionism is growing. On the other hand, that some phenomena are
multiply realised by different kinds of lower-level system poses a challenge
to reductionism.
Multiple realisation (MR) implies that higher-level phenomena are in-
dependent of the lower level in the following sense: they are invariant with
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respect to a swapping out of their lower-level constituents.1 This indepen-
dence leads to a demand for explanation – how is it that multiple different
kinds of system can exhibit the same phenomenon? The challenge to re-
ductionism then depends on the claim that this demand cannot be met –
that the fact of multiple realisation cannot be reductively explained.
I take this challenge to be one which the reductionist ought to meet, and
it’s the purpose of this paper both to show that anti-reductionists are right
not to be satisfied unless this challenge is answered, but that, with the right
explanatory framework in hand, reductionists have the tools to vindicate
their view. Consequently, I set out and defend a framework for providing
reductive explanations of MR.2
This framework involves the identification of underlying commonali-
ties in the various systems which instantiate the multiply realised phenom-
ena. In addition, I claim that the features which distinguish such systems
at the lower level must be shown not to make a difference to the multiply
realised phenomena. This combination of identifying the commonalities
with deriving that the distinguishing features don’t make a difference guar-
antees the bottom-up prediction and explanation of multiple realisation. I
illustrate this framework with a case study.
One of the advantages of this framework is that it makes clear the cri-
teria that the reductionist has to fulfil in order to explain multiple realisa-
tion. This is important because the various accounts of reduction employed
within this debate do not standardly require that the fact of multiple realisa-
tion be explained. As such, I argue that these more demanding constraints
on reduction are appropriate if one wishes to address the anti-reductionists’
concerns about MR. Note that, on this framework, reductionism does not
imply eliminativism about higher-level kinds.
The remainder of the paper responds to potential objections. Some
might claim (see e.g. (Polger and Shapiro, 2016)) that a phenomenon ought
not to count as MR if it can be explained by the identification of common-
alities – I argue that this amounts to the view that MR is inexplicable as
a matter of conceptual necessity. For reasons developed below (see also
e.g. (Aizawa, 2018)), I hold that this approach is mistaken. First, it’s typical
among both philosophers and scientists to accept that multiple realisation
1I use ‘MR’ to refer to ‘multiple realisation’, ‘multiple realisability’, ‘multiply realised’,
. . .
2While reductionism and MR were once presumed to be incompatible, (Bickle, 2020)
shows that this view is increasingly rejected.
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is commonplace. If MR were, by necessity, inexplicable then a great many
paradigm cases of MR would not count as such. This would suggest a
re-labelling strategy that seems unlikely to catch on. Second, multiple real-
isation poses an explanandum which ought to be taken seriously, and which
forms the basis of the anti-reductionist argument. Proponents of this objec-
tion would simply have to dismiss such a demand for explanation.
A second objection is that any adequate explanation of MR is nec-
essarily anti-reductionist (see e.g. (Batterman, 2018) and (Morrison, 2012,
2014)). In countering these views, I claim that explanatory pluralism (see
e.g. (Sober, 1999)) is insufficient. As such, I argue that an additional, sui
generis reductive explanatory strategy ought to be added to the toolbox in
order to rebut claims that MR is reductively inexplicable.
In §2 I set out what I take MR to involve, and how it might be explained.
I develop this account with a simple case study from physics in §3. Then,
in §4, I respond to various potential objections. In §5 I conclude.
2 A Framework for Multiple Realisation
2.1 Definition
A higher-level phenomenon P is multiply realised if and only
if the same phenomenon P is realised in at least two different
lower-level systems.
This definition is preliminary and requires clarification on two counts:
what is meant by ‘same phenomenon’? And what is meant by ‘different
lower-level systems’?
Following that clarification, in §2.2 I articulate what would be required
for a reductive explanation of instances of MR which conform to this defi-
nition; and in §4 I relate this account of MR to others in the literature.
Phenomena are posited on the basis of experimental data and provide
evidence for more general theories. Examples of phenomena include ‘weak
neutral currents, the decay of the proton, and chunking and recency effects
in human memory’ (Bogen and Woodward, 1988, p. 306). Phenomena are
individuated by the scientific theory that describes them, thus we may say
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it’s the same phenomenon if it is well described by the same theory in the
same conditions.3
Importantly for compatibility with multiple realisability, phenomena
are not individuated in terms of their realisers.4 Thus, as discussed below,
an entity may be identified as an electrical conductor because it satisfies as-
pects of circuit theory, but it’s not consequently possible to infer its specific
constitution. A principal feature of systems instantiating MR is that they
may be identified at multiple levels where higher-level identification does
not commit us to any specific realisation.
What is meant by ‘different lower-level systems’? Multiply realised
phenomena are invariant with respect to certain changes in the lower-level
system. I distinguish between two ways a system might be changed.5 On
the one hand, consider varying the particular microstate of a system – i.e.
changes which the system might actually undergo. On the other, consider
varying the very nature and make-up of the system itself – these are coun-
terlegal or imagined changes.
Phenomena which are invariant with respect to the first kind of change
are called ‘robust’ – some phenomenon is robust if and only if it’s invari-
ant with respect to changes allowed by the laws or dynamics at the lower
level. For example, most thermodynamic phenomena are robust across a
wide range of different molecular arrangements, where the molecular laws
allow the system to transition from one to another arrangement.6 The no-
tion of changes allowed by the laws or dynamics is level-relative: when
discussing the robustness or multiple realisation of a given phenomenon
we (implicitly) specify a higher and lower level of description. Relative to
such level-based descriptions a particular precision of description will be
appropriate, and the allowed changes will be consequently defined.
Having set aside robustness, we can now refine the definition above:
A higher-level phenomenon P is multiply realised if and only if
3MR is here defined in terms of (kinds of) phenomena, but MR may alternatively be
defined in terms of kinds of entities. Nothing crucial to the argument relies on this choice:
one may view electrical conductivity as a multiply realised phenomenon, or, alternatively,
electrical conductor may be considered to be a kind of entity.
4See §4 for a discussion of various views which deny this.
5See (Hüttemann et al., 2015) for similar distinctions.
6Robustness is particularly relevant to characterising emergence, see e.g. (Butterfield,
2011; Franklin and Knox, 2018).
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the same phenomenon P is realised in at least two lower-level
systems where the lower-level laws or dynamics forbid transi-
tions between the states of those systems.
This distinction will be further exemplified in the next section where I
claim that electrical conductivity is multiply realised by, say, lithium and
potassium, because no realistic process can convert a strip of lithium into a
strip of potassium. On the other hand, the electrical conductivity exhibited
by strips of either metal will be robust for a range of different changes: the
macroscopic physical properties will be the same even where constituent
atoms have moved about.
The aim in making this distinction is to ensure that MR is not absolutely
ubiquitous: every higher-level phenomenon is robust with respect to some
changes, but MR phenomena are thought to prompt special explananda.7
Two further comments are relevant. First, non-fundamental levels are
generically restricted both temporally and spatially; consequently, changes
are nomologically impossible at some level if they happen so rarely that
they fall outside the time-scale of that level. As such, a phenomenon may
count as multiply realised by two different systems even where, on suffi-
ciently long time-scales, some set of changes would lead to both systems’
being well described by the same lower-level state. Thus, pressure in a
sample of CO2 gas is robust because there are various different microstates
which realise the same pressure, and transitions between those microstates
are allowed by the lower-level laws. On the other hand, pressure in gases
is multiply realised because both CO2 and Ne gases may realise the same
pressure, but on timescales less than the age of the universe a sample of
CO2 gas cannot change into one of Ne gas.
Second, this distinction will not define a division between robustness
and MR which always squares with our intuitions. For example, certain
colour changes in metals will be allowed by the lower-level laws or dy-
namics while others will not; thus, differently coloured metals are, in some
instances, trivial but genuine examples of MR. Any way of excluding such
boring cases would be arbitrary. As soon as we can explain a given instance
of MR, it may count as less surprising, or even boring; but the requirement
that MR be surprising would effectively undermine the interesting philo-
sophical and scientific projects of explaining MR – such a stipulation would
7Alternatively, ubiquity could be avoided by adding further conditions; in §4.1 I argue
that the conditions advocated by (Polger and Shapiro, 2016) are unattractive.
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beg the title question of the paper.
The distinction between MR and robustness is useful: it allows that,
while there are genuine instances of MR in the world, not every higher-
level phenomenon is multiply realised; however, I do not claim that the
distinction is profound. The distinction is nonetheless crucial to those who
wish to claim both that MR is instantiated fairly widely, and that it is by
definition incompatible with reduction. If those philosophers fail to make
this distinction they will have a very difficult case to argue; if all robust
phenomena count as multiply realised, and multiply realised phenomena
are irreducible, then all robust phenomena will be classed as irreducible.
Every phenomenon and every kind term identified in any science is robust
with respect to some changes: no phenomenon only exists at, say, a single
real-number-valued temperature. The failure of reduction would thus be
absolutely generic. As far as I know, such a claim isn’t made by advocates
of the MR argument, and would leave their position rather more radical
than is commonly acknowledged.
2.2 Explanation and Reduction
A further distinction is worth making at this stage between explanations
that refer to MR phenomena, and explanations that tell us how MR is pos-
sible. One reason to take MR seriously is that the former kind of expla-
nation is commonplace: many different scientific explanations refer to MR
phenomena; that fact leaves it open whether or not explanations of MR are
available. My project is non-eliminativist – as such I think it inadvisable to
attempt to purge science of reference to MR phenomena. In other words,
I do not purport to replace explanations which refer to MR phenomena,
rather I aim to explain why such reference is successful.
With that distinction in hand, there are two more kinds of explanation.
First, one may explain a given phenomenon in terms of each of its indi-
vidual realisers – call this specificity explanation; second, one may explain
that the phenomenon is multiply realised in terms of the common features
shared by each realiser, and the details which make such common features
sufficient for the occurrence of the phenomenon – call this commonality
explanation. Specificity explanations do not explain the multiple realisa-
tion of the phenomenon, they rather focus on the individual behaviour
in each lower-level system; commonality explanations, by contrast, do ex-
plain multiple realisation. For example, specificity explanations will ex-
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plain the particular conductivity of some metal, while commonality expla-
nations will account for the multiple realisation of the conductivity.
This distinction corresponds to that employed by (Batterman, 2017, p.
570): ‘There are two kinds of “why-questions” that one might ask about a
pattern of [multiply realised] behavior.
- Type I: One might ask why a particular instance of the pattern was
realized.
- Type II: One might ask why the pattern itself exists across its different
realizations’.
It’s the second type of question that commonality explanations address
– these demonstrate how multiple realisation comes about, not just why
some particular phenomenon is instantiated in some particular system.8
In other words, one has merely restated the fact of multiple realisation
if one demonstrates that system A exhibits phenomenon P and system B
exhibits phenomenon P etc. As such, any system by system explanation
will inevitably fail to address the type II explanandum. In order to explain
the multiple realisation of phenomenon P it must be shown that all these
systems display the same phenomenon in virtue of something which they
share – that’s why commonality explanations are required.
The way to offer a commonality explanation is, then, as follows: one
explains the common behaviour by identifying an aspect or feature which
is shared by the different systems, and one additionally demonstrates that
the common features lead to the observed common behaviour in each case.
While in some cases this second step may be left out, it is implicitly re-
quired.
When MR is instantiated and explicable, its realisers have both com-
monalities and heterogeneities; so, an explanation of MR must both iden-
tify the commonalities and demonstrate that the heterogeneities are irrel-
evant, in the sense that they do not make a difference to the MR phe-
nomenon. That is, I claim that the only adequate explanations of MR are
commonality explanations. As such, henceforth, all references to explana-
tions of MR carry the implicit assumption that the explanation is a com-
8An explanation of this type will account for how the same phenomenon is realised in
different ‘ways’ – see (Aizawa, 2018).
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monality explanation.9
Now we have a general model for how to explain MR, we ought to ask
whether such explanations are reductive: is MR explained from the bottom
up?
Insofar as reduction is possible, for any given phenomenon, one may
come to understand why it is the way it is from the bottom up. That is, re-
ductions dissolve the explanatory gaps which motivate anti-reductionists.
As further discussed in §4.2, I think that standard accounts of reduction,
which predict the phenomena for each realiser in turn, only address type I
explananda. Type II explananda are those which motivate puzzlement about
multiple realisation, and, as such, no reductive explanation of multiple re-
alisation is adequate unless it addresses one of these.
An explanation of a multiply realised phenomenon is, thus, reductive
insofar as it explains why that phenomenon is multiply realised with ref-
erence solely to lower-level details. The reductive constraint on explana-
tion of MR amounts to the stipulation that the identified commonalities are
lower-level commonalities, and that the irrelevance of the heterogeneities
is secured by lower-level facts or processes.
Such reductive explanations need not be eliminativist in the sense that
the MR phenomena are to be excluded from our ontology once they are
explained. In fact, many reductive explanations will establish that the MR
phenomenon should be included in our ontology. That’s because by iden-
tifying the commonalities and the real, physical processes which secure
the irrelevance of heterogeneities, we establish that the multiple realisa-
tion is not a pure artefact of our descriptive practices. We haven’t simply
imagined that the phenomenon is multiply realised – we can derive that
fact from details of the realising systems. Reductive explanations of MR
thus underwrite the value of the unified multiply realised description even
while they allow us to understand, from the bottom up, why the multiple
realisation obtains.
Note that, at various stages through the process of seeking to explain
commonalities, we may acknowledge that the commonality is not in fact
out there in the world; that, instead, it’s illusory, or that it’s a consequence
of our epistemic limitations, or an artefact of our organisation of the world;
we might also acknowledge that the MR is purely coincidental or a statis-
9It’s further argued in §4.2 that, while explanatory pluralism is an attractive position,
not all kinds of explanation can address all kinds of explananda.
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tical fluke.10 Where any of that happens the demands for explanation, and
the prospects for anti-reductionism (in the case that reductive explanation
fails) are correspondingly lessened – this overlaps with the debate over sci-
entific realism, and, as such, will not be further discussed here.11
A reductive explanation of MR involves the identification of underlying
common features and the demonstration, in lower-level terms, that such
features are sufficient for the common behaviour. In the next section this
framework for explaining MR is exemplified with a case study.
Note that different processes may be responsible in each realiser for se-
curing the irrelevance of the heterogeneities. It’s thus worth emphasising
that, while the commonalities are in common, an account of each individ-
ual system is, in many cases, required in order to establish that the het-
erogeneities are irrelevant and, consequently, that the commonalities are
sufficient for the MR phenomena to occur.
The upshot of this section is that MR is defined such that it is instan-
tiated in the world and that reductive explanation is possible. I do not
claim that all cases of MR can be offered reductive explanations; in my
view, that’s an empirically sensitive question, and reduction is hard! The
advantage of my framework is that that question can be addressed, and, es-
pecially in mature sciences, reductive explanations of MR can be provided.
3 A Case Study
The reductive strategy outlined above is, in this section, cashed out in terms
of a prototype reductive explanation of multiple realisation.
Consider the phenomenon that various different metals conduct elec-
tricity.12 For our purposes, we may restrict attention to the Alkali (group I)
metals; although electrical conductivity is, of course, multiply realised by a
far wider class of materials, the reductive story is much simpler if we stick
10Some statistical flukes might be selected for – this would lead to MR which could not
be reductively explained in a way that should not trouble the reductionist. However, the
process of selection might pose its own challenges to reduction.
11It’s worth emphasising that the question here is not whether we should be metaphysi-
cal realists about the universal which putatively underlies a given common feature; rather
we are interested in whether or not there is any stable way of identifying the putative com-
monality such that it doesn’t depend on the way we happen to do science.
12This example is in part inspired by that in (Aizawa, 2013).
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to this restricted class, and the philosophical moral generalises.
It’s worth emphasising that this example is fairly naturalistic: we
needn’t think of electrical conductivity in terms of human interactions –
it manifests, for example, when lightning strikes. If one still has reserva-
tions that the example is unacceptably ad hoc or anthropocentric, (Franklin,
2019) demonstrates that a similar reductive approach may be applied to the
universality of critical phenomena, which, as briefly discussed in §4.2, has
been touted by some as a paradigm instance of irreducible MR.
Moreover, the phenomenon fits my definition: first, the phenomenon of
conduction of electricity in lithium is identical to the phenomenon of con-
duction of electricity in all the other group I metals. As noted above, the
identity of phenomena depends on the higher-level scientific theory. Solid
state physics, see e.g. (Kantorovich, 2004), uses the same formalism to de-
scribe the conductivity of all such metals. At a greater level of abstraction,
circuit theory also uses the same functional relationships to describe this
phenomenon independently of which particular metal realises the conduc-
tivity. Note that neither solid state physics nor circuit theory are parts of
fundamental physics!
Second, the realisers of electrical conductivity are different. Group I
metals all have many behaviours in common, but do have clear differences:
for example they have different resistivity, different melting and boiling
points, different densities, and they have differently coloured flames.13 Al-
though fission and fusion may occur in specialised circumstances at an
atomic level, a piece of lithium will not transform into a piece of sodium
within a time-scale of the order of the age of the universe.14 Despite their
sharing a variety of physical properties, there is no non-question-begging
way of saying that lithium is identical to, say, sodium.
Their electrical conductivity is the multiply realised phenomenon
which serves as my case study. If one prefers to think of MR in terms of
kinds, then this could be substituted for the claim that electrical conductor is
multiply realised by these different metals.
Can the fact that electrical conductivity is multiply realised be reduc-
tively explained? Following the framework outlined above, such explana-
13Lithium, sodium, potassium, rubidium and caesium have red, yellow, violet, yellow
violet and blue flames respectively; see (Dye and Tepper, 2018).
14Their difference is thus a consequence of the fact that the level on which lithium is
identified is temporally restricted.
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tion requires the identification of both the commonalities among the realis-
ers and the features which make the heterogeneities irrelevant to the shared
behaviour, all in lower-level terms.
Two features of group I metals make them such good conductors: the
fact that they have a single electron in their outer shell, and the arrange-
ment of the repeated unit cells of the metal’s lattice structure.
Figure 1: A representation of the distribution of electrons in a metal. This is not to scale.
Group I metals all have a free electron in their outer shell. This electron
may, with little energetic cost, dissociate from its atom. As displayed in
figure 1, such electrons form a cloud which is distributed among the atoms
in the lattice. The crucial feature which allows for conductivity is that the
quantum wavefunction which represents the state of each electron will then
be delocalised and spread across the whole material. The Pauli exclusion
principle precludes such electrons from inhabiting the same state, as such
they are effectively non-interacting in the delocalised cloud, which is con-
sequently well described as a freely moving gas.
The regular lattice structure in figure 1 means that there is no net force
acting on the cloud. This has the consequence that, when an electric field is
applied, the electron gas may freely travel in the direction of the field lines
and form an electric current. In brief: dissociated electrons form quantum
mechanical waves in periodic potentials – that’s what allows electrical con-
ductivity to be exhibited in multiple different metals.
The commonality among all the metals is that their atoms all have the
same number of electrons in their outer shell and that their atoms are ar-
ranged into similar lattice structures. These are, of course, lower-level com-
monalities. Although conductivity is identifiable at the higher level, the
features which lead to common electrical conductivity in various systems
can be specified in lower-level terms. In addition, the electric current can
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be identified in lower-level terms as a net flow of electrons.
The remaining feature to be explained is that the differences between
the metals – the heterogeneities – are irrelevant to the phenomenon of in-
terest. Only if that can be established may we explain how the common
features are sufficient for the common behaviour. The irrelevance of hetero-
geneities may, however, also be explained in lower-level terms. There are
two salient features which distinguish group I metals at the atomic scale.
First, each metal has a different number of electrons – that difference is irrel-
evant due to the stability of the filled shells. At low temperatures, electrons
in inner shells are not readily excited and their different numbers are irrel-
evant. Although at higher temperatures the system will be more energetic
and the inner electrons may become relevant, this does not undermine the
explanation – it is a generic feature of multiple realisation that the common
behaviour is only exhibited in restricted contexts.
The second way in which group I metals differ from each other lies in
their different proton and neutron numbers. However, the different consti-
tutions of the nuclei are irrelevant since they all compose lattice structures.
As noted above, this structure ensures a periodic potential which allows
the electron gas to flow freely throughout the metal. The periodic potential
of the lattice can be explained in terms of the underlying atomic bonding
which leads to the lattice formation.
While the heterogeneities are, thus, shown to be irrelevant to the met-
als’ conductivity, this does not imply that the commonalities (singly) realise
the conductivity. It’s physically nonsensical to consider a metal or its con-
ductivity in the absence of its protons and neutrons! This point is discussed
further in §4.
It’s important to bear in mind that, while this simplified case study in-
volves a similar account of the irrelevance of heterogeneities for each re-
aliser, in many contexts such stories will diverge – so long as the different
systems have different underlying properties and these are irrelevant, the
process by which they are irrelevant may differ for each system. Even in
this case study, the processes which secure irrelevance of heterogeneities
may differ between materials: I noted that the different nuclear constitu-
tions are screened off by the fact that the electrons interact with a periodic
potential, but the fact that there’s a periodic potential depends on the lat-
tice structure, which may differ somewhat among different metals. This is
a mild difference, but it illustrates the broader point that part of explaining
12
MR involves taking account of the peculiarities of each realiser.
In sum, we may adduce, in lower-level terms: first, the commonalities –
alkali metals all have a single outer-shell electron and similar atomic lattice
structures; and second, the irrelevance of the heterogeneities which follows
from the stability of the inner shells and the periodicity of the lattice struc-
ture.
4 Objections and Responses
4.1 MR is Essentially Inexplicable
Some might object to my claim that MR can be reductively explained be-
cause they hold MR to be inexplicable by commonality explanations as a
matter of conceptual necessity. As argued above and further developed in
§4.2, commonality explanations are the only way to provide explanations
of multiple realisation.
In this section I argue that it is a mistake to define MR as essentially in-
explicable: the issues at stake in this paper ought to be settled by empirical
investigation – facts about the world make it such that particular cases of
MR are explicable and reducible, or not.
I resist the conflation of MR with inexplicability and irreducibility and
argue that whether or not a phenomenon is MR is, at least to some extent,
independent of whether or not it can be reductively explained. A major
reason to maintain this distinction is that we may identify and discuss MR
phenomena without thereby committing ourselves to an account of reduc-
tive explanation. As such, by resisting the conflation we conserve a term
for the interesting fact that various phenomena exhibit the confluence of
commonality and heterogeneity which corresponds to MR. Whatever one’s
standards for reduction, it should be acknowledged that instances of MR
still pose interesting and important explananda for scientific research.
Maintaining the distinction between inexplicability and MR allows re-
ductionists and anti-reductionists alike to acknowledge that some phenom-
ena are multiply realised, that these pose a challenge for reductive expla-
nation, but that that challenge may not be insuperable. Whether or not the
challenge can, in fact, be overcome is then to be decided on a case by case
basis rather than in principle.
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Polger and Shapiro (see their (2016), (Shapiro, 2018), and references
therein) have done a great deal of work to demonstrate that, for various pu-
tative instances of MR, the realisers in fact share common causal structure.
There is, thus, a sense in which their project can be construed as providing
reductive explanations of MR. However, they are committed to the confla-
tion just outlined. That is, they argue that putative cases of MR ought not to
count as such insofar as they can be reductively explained by commonality
explanations.
According to (Shapiro, 2000, p. 646):
two realizations of a kind T are in fact different kinds of re-
alizations of T only when they differ in their causally relevant
properties, that is, the properties by which they contribute to
the capacity, purpose, goal, and the like that serves to individu-
ate T as the kind that it is.
Shapiro goes on to argue that MR is in fact rather rare, because in many
putative instances of MR the two realisations don’t differ with respect to
causally relevant properties, they rather differ with respect to their causally
irrelevant properties. For example, given the analysis in the previous sec-
tion, his account implies that one ought not to say that the kind electrical
conductor is multiply realised simply in virtue of the fact that both lithium
and potassium conduct electricity. This is because the features which dis-
tinguish lithium from potassium might be claimed to be causally irrelevant
to individuation qua electrical conductor.
This view is defended by (Polger and Shapiro, 2016) who consider a
range of neurological case studies that have been described as instances of
MR. They suggest that in almost all such cases the causal process which
gives rise to the putatively multiply realised kind is identical.15 For them,
in order to qualify as MR, the relevant causal structure must be different.
While Polger and Shapiro have done significant and important work
in bringing empirical considerations to bear on discussions of MR, it’s un-
fortunate that they are committed to this account of MR. Not only does it
make MR essentially inexplicable by commonality explanations (because
15While they (ibid., p. 73) accept that genuine multiple realisation is commonly found
among artefactual kinds, they note that the interesting philosophy of science questions pre-
suppose naturalistic multiple realisation.
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such explanations would mean it no longer counted as MR), but it also
undermines an important scientific project: that of accounting for how it
is that there are so many instances of higher-level phenomena realised by
multiple systems distinct at the lower level.16 Important work in coun-
tering this aspect of Polger and Shapiro’s project has been carried out by
Aizawa and Gillett (see e.g. (Aizawa and Gillett, 2009)), who argue that
multiple realisation is pervasive in the natural world, and provide a partial
explanation of that fact for some biological systems. In addition, (Aizawa,
2013) also offers an explanation of the pervasiveness of MR in some physi-
cal systems.
Thus, my framework in §2.2 may be used to interpret aspects of Gillett
and Aizawa’s work as offering commonality explanations of MR.17 How-
ever, their account is not explicitly targeted at reductive explanations of
MR, and they do not discuss the type II explanandum. Consequently, their
account is, in general, insufficient to address the anti-reductionists’ worries
about MR, though that is not their explicit target.18
In this paper, I show how a general framework for reductive explana-
tion is compatible with MR, and that, once one recognises this fact, one can
engage with the interesting project of identifying cases of MR, and assess-
ing whether or not these can be reductively explained. Some of the expla-
nations offered by Aizawa and Gillett fit into this framework and may be
used to offer reductive explanations of certain instances of MR phenomena.
Polger and Shapiro differ from me, and from Aizawa and Gillett, in
their account of multiple realisation. In my opinion, they err in claiming
that once common causal structure has been identified, the phenomena in
question should no longer count as multiply realised. If one were to accept
Polger and Shapiro’s analysis, one would be committed to categorising pu-
tative cases of MR as either inexplicable, or not multiply realised. By resist-
ing the conflation, the category of MR-but-explicable is maintained and the
interesting scientific explanations of how multiple realisation comes about
are viable. In other words: once we accept that MR is reductively expli-
cable in principle, we can engage in the framework laid out above which
asks whether, in practice, particular instances of MR can be reductively ex-
16For a related argument that this account does not aid the reductionist project, see
(Bickle, 2010).
17An additional aspect of their work focusses on the metaphysics of realisation – see
(Gillett, 2003); I don’t advocate any particular stance in that debate in this paper.
18The framework for reduction in (Gillett, 2016) does not consider type II explananda.
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plained.
On the account defended here, it’s a discovered fact about the world
that there are many phenomena which are identified independently of their
realisation and are instantiated in multiple different kinds of system. Fail-
ing to acknowledge this as an explanandum would be to sidestep the sub-
stantial challenge to reduction which MR (or putative MR) poses; this line
of reasoning is further defended in §4.2.
On my view, multiple realisation is fairly commonplace, but can be ex-
plained. Polger and Shapiro’s view is that it’s much rarer but can’t be ex-
plained. In (Polger and Shapiro, 2016, p. 39), they defend their view by
claiming that a more liberal view ‘entails an undesirable profligacy of dis-
tinct realizations for every kind, and undermines the significance of real-
ization within debates over the autonomy of the special sciences’. While
I agree that just any lower-level variation is insufficient for MR, I think
that the MR-robustness distinction drawn above in §2 rules out ‘undesir-
able profligacy’. On the other hand, regarding autonomy, I’d argue that
the autonomy of the special sciences is, in fact, closely related to multiple
realisation as I define it: as Polger and Shapiro acknowledge (ibid., chapter
10.4), a system has some claim to autonomy if it provides for prediction and
explanation at the higher level. Insofar as such autonomy can be explained,
the threat to reduction is mitigated, but the debate over such cases is only
confused by claiming that autonomy, or indeed MR, is rare but mysterious.
Lastly, even if Polger and Shapiro’s approach is taken to provide an ex-
planation of MR, their explanatory strategy is somewhat lacking. That’s
because, while they rightly emphasise the importance of demonstrating
what’s in common between the realisers,19 they do not require that we also
demonstrate that the heterogeneous features are irrelevant; and it is pre-
cisely this extra step that is required to dispel the apparent mystery that
different systems exhibit common behaviour.
It’s the very fact that different systems act similarly which is so remark-
able – that’s what motivates (Fodor, 1974) in his discussion of the multiple
realisation of currency and (Putnam, 1975) in his discussion of the multiple
realisation of square and round pegs. That there is MR is a consequence
of the fact that genuinely different systems do, in some circumstances, ex-
19Though their emphasis on common causal structure will be unattractive to those who
question the applicability of causal vocabulary to the physical sciences; see e.g. (Price and
Corry, 2007).
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hibit identical phenomena notwithstanding their differences. MR is thus
explained by showing both that such systems have features in common,
and that, in those circumstances, their differences are irrelevant. By failing
to offer explanations of this form, those who conflate inexplicability with
MR cannot adequately respond to the anti-reductionist’s challenge.
In part, my commitment to the distinction between MR and inexplica-
bility stems from analysis of case studies from physics. In this context, we
have phenomena which are quantitatively identical across a range of differ-
ent systems; as such, there is good reason to think that multiple realisation
is not an artefact of our classificatory practices. Examination of cases from
physics also helps establish that reductive explanations of multiple realisa-
tion are the subject of active scientific inquiry.
The examination of case studies from the physical sciences is particu-
larly helpful in these fraught philosophical discussions. Cases drawn from
the biological sciences are far more complex and, consequently, reductive
explanation is harder to come by. Therefore, in such contexts it’s difficult to
distinguish whether the source of apparent irreducibility is multiple reali-
sation, or some other feature of the target system. Physics examples are, in
general, more susceptible to reductive explanation, and the MR challenge
can, thus, be assessed independently of confounding factors. However, the
discussion in the philosophy of physics literature has led to a different ob-
jection to an approach like my own.
4.2 Commonality Explanations of MR are Anti-reductionist
I claimed in §2.2 that specificity explanations of MR phenomena are inad-
equate to address the MR explanandum. Once we have a reductive expla-
nation for why lithium is a good electrical conductor, and why sodium is
a good electrical conductor we still have an explanatory demand: what
common feature of group I metals leads to the phenomenon that they all
conduct electricity? Where the same phenomenon is observed in all these
different systems we have multiple realisation and thus we have an ex-
planandum for which the reductionist ought to be able to provide a reduc-
tive explanation.
Some might argue that no reductive explanation could address such
explananda. For example, Batterman’s view (e.g. (2000,2018)) is that there
is MR, and that it can be explained, but that MR can only be explained
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anti-reductionistically.20 As such, he denies the potential for the kind of
reductive explanatory strategy outlined above. An important insight due
to Batterman, on which I build in this paper, is that the MR explanandum
requires a sui generis explanatory strategy. While I have argued that carry-
ing out such a strategy can provide evidence for reduction, and Batterman
disagrees, I follow him in claiming that once one acknowledges that there
is MR in the world, a novel explanandum follows.
It’s particularly worth highlighting this set of claims due to Batterman
because they serve to undermine the explanatory pluralism advocated by
(Sober, 1999):
Generality is one virtue that an explanation can have, but
a distinct – and competing – virtue is depth, and it is on this
dimension that lower-level explanations often score better than
higher-level explanations. The reductionist claim that lower-
level explanations are always better and the anti-reductionist
claim that they are always worse are both mistaken.
[(Sober, 1999, p. 560), original emphasis]
Sober argues that multiple realisation need not trouble the reduction-
ist. He does so by observing that different kinds of explanation are use-
ful or applicable to different ends. He observes that adding content to an
explanation does not stop its being an explanation and that reductions –
which offer bottom-up explanations – will generally be of interest even if
the higher-level explanations are adequate in some contexts.
Sober’s arguments are well-taken: it’s certainly the case that propor-
tionate higher-level explanations are often superior qua explanations of
higher-level explananda. However, not just any kind of explanation is ade-
quate to explain MR. Given that Sober is talking about multiple realisation
and explanatory approaches thereto, it seems fair to say that he has missed
the anti-reductionist’s point. This observation is emphasised by (Batter-
man, 2018, 2000), who identifies an explanandum which is missed by many
reductionists:21
20(Batterman, 2000, p. 134): ‘[m]y position is unusual because it asserts the possibility
of providing physical explanations for why certain special science properties are multiply
realized without also providing a reduction’.
21Note that (Morrison, 2012, pp. 164–165) makes a similar point – she argues that what
I call specificity explanations are inadequate to explaining instances of MR and that some
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MR: How can systems that are heterogeneous at some (typ-
ically) micro-scale exhibit the same pattern of behavior at the
macro-scale?
. . .
if one thinks (MR) is a legitimate scientific question, one
needs to consider different explanatory strategies. The renor-
malization group and the theory of homogenization are just
such strategies. They are inherently multi-scale. They are not
bottom-up derivational explanations.
[(Batterman, 2018, pp. 4, 14–15)]
I agree with Batterman that standard reductionist approaches miss the
MR explananda.22 The question labelled MR prompts us to look at the dis-
tinct realisers of multiply realised phenomena and ask why all of these
different underlying systems realise the same higher-level phenomenon.
Batterman counters Sober’s explanatory pluralism by arguing that, in cer-
tain cases, answers to MR are incompatible with reduction. He claims that
universality is multiple realisation and that the full explanation of univer-
sality necessarily proceeds at the higher level. Batterman’s contention is
that lower-level and higher-level explanations are not equally adequate for
understanding cases of MR. In fact, specifically for certain such cases the
higher-level (or multi-level) explanations are the only ones which are able
to address the principal explanandum.23
While I disagree with Batterman’s anti-reductionist conclusion, I accept
his more general assertion: that it’s not good enough simply to say, as Sober
does, that different explanations are good for different ends. The different
descriptions and explanations of electrical conductivity – some in terms of
abstracted circuit theory, and others in terms of the microscopic details of
each metal – do not lead to an answer to MR. And it is that question which
really provides the motivation for the anti-reductionist. Sober’s pluralism
is inadequate to refute the assertion that multiple realisation is inexplicable
from the bottom up.
top-down (anti-reductionist) constraints are necessary. (Ross, 2020) makes a similar point
with a focus on causal explanation.
22See e.g. (Kim, 2005).
23Although Batterman thinks that universality can be offered an explanation, he contends
that this explanation is unavailable from the bottom up due to its appeal to renormalisation
group (RG) methods; his technical argument is criticised in e.g. (Saatsi and Reutlinger, 2018;
Franklin, 2019).
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I have argued in this paper that MR may nonetheless be answered re-
ductively. That is, I claim that, if we adduce the commonalities among
lower-level realisers and identify the lower-level processes which make
the heterogeneities irrelevant to the common behaviour, then we have pro-
vided a reductive explanation of MR. As such, the anti-reductionist’s mo-
tivations may be addressed, and the compatibility of MR with reduction
may be established. MR poses an explanandum which requires a sui generis
explanation; it’s just that reductive explanations of MR are available.
5 Conclusion
Multiple realisation arguments have been taken by many to settle the case
against reduction. And yet there’s a fair bit of ambiguity over the structure
of the argument. One strand of the debate observes that, given multiple re-
alisation, the higher-level facts do not determinately pick out unique lower-
level states. However, rather than an argument, this is more a restatement
of multiple realisation, and it is hardly surprising: everyone should accept
that higher levels are more coarse-grained and less determinate than lower
levels.
A better argument notes that multiple realisation corresponds to invari-
ance with respect to a swapping out of the lower-level constituents. The
consequent independence poses an explanatory challenge – how come a
common higher-level description is available despite lower-level hetero-
geneity? This challenge is one that the reductionist ought to meet, and, in
this paper I showed that this challenge may be answered.
It’s worth considering once again the response of those philosophers
who’d define MR such that, in principle, it’s not reductively explicable.
First, they might argue that the kind of commonality explanation discussed
here is insufficient for reduction. As such, they might accept that MR can
be explained in the sense articulated above, but that reduction is ruled out.
Importantly, I think that MR is, in general, a sign that we should think
the higher level ineliminable: that, in most cases, MR phenomena should
be included in our ontological inventory. As such, I have no quarrel with
those who take MR to be incompatible with eliminativist reduction. I have
merely argued that this does not imply that MR is mysterious or inexplica-
ble from the bottom up.
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Second, they might claim that, while the framework developed here
does lead to greater understanding of various worldly phenomena in many
contexts, such phenomena do not count as MR. MR would thus be rather
rare, but wherever it was in fact instantiated, it would be inexplicable. I
think that by conflating multiple realisation with inexplicability, such an ac-
count would lose the important category of MR-but-reductively-explicable.
It’s far better to define MR such that it poses an explanatory challenge
which can, in some though not necessarily all cases, be addressed.
In this paper, I claimed that multiple realisation is found whenever the
same phenomenon is realised by multiple different systems. I went on to
argue that it is best to view the MR argument against reduction as posing
a novel explanandum. MR requires new explanations in addition to those
provided by traditional reductive approaches; the availability of such ex-
planations must be assessed on a case by case basis. Thus, MR does raise a
problem for reduction, and it’s an empirically sensitive matter whether or
not reduction can withstand the MR argument.
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